帮我翻译

帮我翻译~

这是杨玲，她也是我的朋友。她喜欢看故事书，她有本很长的书。她给也喜欢弹钢琴。

stone
[stEun]
n.
石, 石头, 宝石

Stone
[stEun]
斯通(①姓氏 ②Harlan Fiske, 1872-1946, 美国法学家, 1941-1946任美国最高法院首席法官)

stone
stone
AHD:[st½n]
D.J.[stoun]
K.K.[ston]
n.（名词）
Concreted earthy or mineral matter; rock.
石头：混凝土或矿物质；岩石
Such concreted matter of a particular type. Often used in combination:
石料：一种特殊类型的这种凝聚物常用在复合词中：
sandstone; soapstone.
砂岩；皂石
A small piece of rock.
一小块岩石
Rock or a piece of rock shaped or finished for a particular purpose, especially:
建筑用石：为某一特殊目的而加工或制做的岩石或岩石小块，尤指：
A piece of rock that is used in construction:
建筑石：用于建筑的一块岩石：
a coping stone; a paving stone.
一块墙压项石；一块铺路石
A gravestone or tombstone.
墓石或碑石
A grindstone, millstone, or whetstone.
磨石，磨盘或油石
A milestone or boundary.
里程碑或界石
A gem or precious stone.
宝石：宝石或珍贵的石头
Something, such as a hailstone, resembling a stone in shape or hardness.
雹：在形状上或硬度上与石头相像之物，如雹块
Botany The hard covering enclosing the seed in certain fruits, such as the cherry, plum, or peach.
【植物学】 水果的硬核：在某些果实内的核外面包着的硬壳，如樱桃、李子或桃核
Pathology A mineral concretion in an organ, such as the kidney or gallbladder, or other body part; a calculus.
【病理学】 结石：在一器官如肾脏或膀胱处或身体其他部位的矿物质凝聚
pl. stoneAbbr. st.A unit of weight in Great Britain, 14 pounds (6.4 kilograms).
【复数】 stone缩写 st.英石：英国重量单位，等于14磅(6.4公斤）
Printing A table with a smooth surface on which page forms are composed.
【印刷术】 排板用石台：具有光滑表面的石板，用于纸张印板排字
adj.（形容词）
Relating to or made of stone:
石的：与石头有关或用石头制成的：
a stone wall.
石墙
Made of stoneware or earthenware.
石制的：用粗陶器或陶器制成的
adv.（副词）
Used as an intensive. Often used in combination:
用作强调成份常用于复合词中：
stone cold; standing stone still.
彻骨之寒；纹丝不动地站着
v.tr.（及物动词）
stoned， ston.ing， stones
To hurl or throw stones at, especially to kill with stones.
向…投掷石头：向…用力抛或扔石头，尤指用石头杀死人
To remove the stones or pits from.
移去石头：从…中移走石头或矿井
To furnish, fit, pave, or line with stones.
铺石头：用石头装饰，挤塞，铺筑或定界
To rub on or with a stone in order to polish or sharpen.
磨光：在石头上或用石头摩擦使光滑或锋利
Obsolete To make hard or indifferent.
【废语】 使冷酷：使变成铁石心肠的或漠不关心的

Middle English
中古英语
from Old English st³n * see stei-
源自 古英语 st³n *参见 stei-

ston“er
n.（名词）

Stone
Stone
AHD:[st½n] Edward Durell (1902-1978)
D.J.[stoun]
K.K.[ston]
NONE（无词性）
American architect who was an exponent of the International Style. Among his notable designs is the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D.C. (1964).
斯通，爱德华·杜雷尔：(1902-1978) 美国建筑师，国际风格的倡导者，他的著名设计之一是华盛顿特区的供艺术表演用的肯尼迪中心(1964年）

stone
[stEun]
n.
石头, 铺石, 石料
宝石, 钻石
碑, 里程碑, 纪念碑, 墓碑
磨(刀)石; 砥石
冰雹
果核
[单复同][英](重量名, 常用来表示体重, 等于14磅; 用于肉类等商品时等于8磅; 用于干酪时等于16磅; 麻是32磅; 玻璃是5磅; 羊毛是24磅)
[古]睾丸
【刷】排版石台, 调墨石台, 石印石
【医】结石(病)
a heap of stones
一堆石头
stone pit
采石场S-Age 石器时代
precious stone
宝石, 钻石
foundation stone
奠基石; 基础; 根源
stone on the chest
[美]肺结核
hail stone
冰雹
stones of apricots
杏仁
a kidney stone
肾结石
His grave is marked by a fine stone.
他的墓有一 块精致的石碑。
He weighs ten stone ten.
他体重一百五十磅。

因此，捐助者/股东提供资金，以目前的计划需要的财务信息的需求，并提供适当的技术援助，定期，特别强调用人标准的做法，例如，贷款回收的报告，收入和成本，投资风险（注布哈特， 1998年） 。由于缺乏准确的财务报告的关键是程序效率低下的原因往往是通过不加制止，年复一年，由于体制失败常常可以作为意外许多利益相关者。然而，捐助者/股东也应谨慎运作效率不强加的唯一标准的评价程序。否则，计划的官员可能有动力转移他们的努力摆脱服务穷人，谁可能是原先的目标人口。

计划也可能会导致效率低下，如果客户面临不相容奖励。现在，众所周知，方便客户的价值和灵活性，获得金融服务的价值超过他们付出了低利率对这些服务（奥特罗和Rhyne ， 1994年） 。程序还没有评估的特点和需求，他们的客户往往征收高额交易成本，对他们，由于该客户端不合作使得其业务亏损（布哈特与唐， 1998年） 。一个例子是所遇到的困难小额程序试图执行该集团的贷款模式在布基纳法索。研究由世界银行（ 1997年）显示，大多数受访女性首选的个人集团的贷款，以避免可能的社会它们之间的仇恨。在一些社区里的同龄群体是社会上可以接受的方法，借款人可寻求潜在的风险最小的同龄人，形成群体。休姆和莫斯利（ 1996年）提供证据证明这种“社会排斥”在斯里兰卡SANASA和孟加拉国的农村倡议。这些程序中，发现了一些人的成员在他们的村庄是太穷了，因此不适合组成员。

这些以及其他类似的经验来自世界各地的说明，当借款人面临不兼容的激励措施，迫使他们形成群体将造成不必要的负担，他们或不良后果的程序，没有提高业务效率的程序（布哈特与唐， 1998年， 1998年） 。

结论

未来成功的小额信贷作为发展工具将在很大程度上取决于是否有能力公营，私营和非盈利性组织制定一整套不同的机构，以满足不同的金融需求各部分的低收入人口。设计中的这类机构必须通知深入了解贫困的原因，以及具体原因，缺乏可行的正式金融中介机构在特定的社区。有哪些主要障碍的目标所面临的人口，特别是轻微的创业和自谋职业穷人，他们试图为经济和社会进步？在何种程度上这些障碍是缺乏相关的金融服务？潜在的客户将需要更多的非金融服务，如培训，技术援助，以及卫生和人类服务，能够有效利用的贷款，以及在何种程度上会影响这种服务的客户的现金流和程序的补贴的依赖？把重点放在这些基本的市场调查和需求评估必须强调在可行性研究之前，任何小额信贷计划的制定了计划。

小额信贷项目设计不应该不考虑他们的机会成本。由于大部分小额信贷计划仍然补贴依赖，美元用于支持小额信贷项目是指美元减少为另一种潜在的发展干预。迄今为止，几乎没有系统的研究已经完成，估计外部效率的小额信贷项目。部分原因是缺乏这种研究，可能是难以量化和比较效益和成本的替代措施。虽然确切的量化未必可行，甚至是可取的，在许多情况下，重要的是发展社会理解，至少从质的模式，主要类型的成本和效益时必须考虑外部效益评价一个小额贷款计划。

最后但并非最不重要，因为社会的发展开始强调内部效率的小额信贷项目，更多的研究需要研究如何激励结构最有利于对这种运作效率。什么体制安排和治理结构的需要，以实现捐助者之间的激励相容/股东，项目经理和客户端？新制度经济学文学（ Eggertsson ， 1990年; Furubotn ＆里希特， 1997年;林和根特， 1995年;奥斯特罗姆，施罗德与温， 1993年;唐， 1992年;威廉姆森， 1985 ） ，强调信息，交易成本和激励问题在经济组织（布哈特与唐， 1998年;加斯特， 1999年） ，有可能提供有益的观点，但还需要做更多的工作在适应这些观点的背景下，以小额信贷服务。

尼廷布哈特是经理格兰特桑顿公司的创业咨询服务实践洛杉矶和前执行主任的南加州大学的（南加大）业务拓展网络。他撰写的内城创业发展：小额信贷挑战（国际信息系统安全认证出版社， 2001年） ，他的工作在企业发展领域的出版了诸如杂志哈佛商业评论，世界发展，经济发展季刊，公共管理和发展，国际期刊的技术合作。他曾担任顾问或董事会成员为各种非营利机构，基金会和政府实体参与创业和经济发展。旋转基金会学者巴特先生拥有工商管理硕士学位的企业精神和企业管理和博士学位在政策，规划，从南加州大学和发展。

水燕他嗯副教授和主任的精神创伤和痛苦计划在南加州大学的政策，规划和发展。他做了广泛的理论和实证工作的社区组织，小额信贷，和环境政策。他撰写的机构和集体行动： SelfGovernance灌区（ ICS的出版社， 1992年） ，和文章等期刊作为我国季刊，土地经济学，公共行政和发展，公众行政部门审查，报公共行政研究和理论，公共生产力和管理审查，和世界发展。

Lack of accurate financial reporting is the key reason why program inefficiencies are often passed on unchecked, year after year, as a result of which institutional failure often comes as a surprise to many stakeholders.
。 Nonetheless, donors/shareholders also have to be cautious in not imposing operational efficiency as the only criterion in evaluating a program.Otherwise, program officials may have an incentive to divert their efforts away from serving the poor, who might be the original target population.（第一段）因此 ， 捐助者/股东提供资金 ， 以目前的计划需要的财务信息的需求 ， 并提供适当的技术援助 ， 定期，特别强调用人标准的做法，例如，贷款回收的报告，收入和成本，投资风险（注布哈特， 1998年） 。由于缺乏准确的财务报告的关键是程序效率低下的原因往往是通过不加制止，年复一年，由于体制失败常常可以作为意外许多利益相关者。然而，捐助者/股东还必须实行谨慎的运作效率不作为唯一的标准 ， 评价程序。否则，计划的官员可能有动力转移他们的努力摆脱服务穷人，谁可能是原先的目标人口

Program inefficiencies also can result if the clients face incompatible incentives. It is now well known that clients value convenience and flexibility in accessing financial services more than they value paying a low-interest rate for such services (Otero & Rhyne, 1994). Programs that have not assessed the characteristics and needs of their clients often impose high transaction costs on them, as a result of which client noncooperation renders their operations nonviable (Bhatt & Tang, 1998b). One example is the difficulties encountered by a microfinance program that tried to implement the group lending model in Burkina Faso. A study by the World Bank (1997) indicates that most of the women surveyed preferred individual to group loans, to avoid possible social animosity among themselves. In some communities where the peer group method is socially acceptable, prospective borrowers may seek out the least risky peers to form groups. Hulme and Mosley (1996) provide evidence of such "social exclusion" in Sri Lanka's SANASA and Bangladesh's BRAC initiatives. In these programs, members identified some people in their villages as being too poor, and hence unsuitable for group membership.（第2段）计划也可能会导致效率低下，如果客户面临不相容奖励。现在，众所周知，方便客户的价值和灵活性，获得金融服务的价值超过他们付出了低利率对这些服务（奥特罗和Rhyne ， 1994年） 。程序还没有评估的特点和需求，他们的客户往往征收高额交易成本，对他们，由于该客户端不合作使得其业务亏损（布哈特与唐， 1998年） 。一个例子是所遇到的困难小额程序试图执行该集团的贷款模式在布基纳法索。研究由世界银行（ 1997年）显示，大多数受访女性首选的个人集团的贷款，以避免可能的社会它们之间的仇恨。在一些社区里的同龄群体是社会上可以接受的方法，借款人可寻求潜在的风险最小的同龄人，形成群体。休姆和莫斯利（ 1996年）提供证据证明这种“社会排斥”在斯里兰卡SANASA和孟加拉国的农村倡议。这些程序中，发现了一些人的成员在他们的村庄是太穷了，因此不适合组成员。

These and other similar experiences from around the world indicate that when borrowers face incompatible incentives, forcing them to form groups would create unnecessary burdens on them or undesirable consequences for the program, without enhancing the operational efficiency of the program (Bhatt & Tang, 1998a, 1998b). （第三段）这些以及其他类似的经验来自世界各地的说明，当借款人面临不兼容的激励措施，迫使他们形成群体将造成不必要的负担，他们或不良后果的程序，没有提高业务效率的程序（布哈特与唐， 1998年， 1998年） 。

Conclusions

The future success of microfinance as a development tool will depend heavily on the ability of public, private, and nonprofit organizations to develop a diverse set of institutions to meet the different financial needs of various segments of low-income populations. The design of such institutions must be informed by a thorough understanding of the causes of poverty, as well as the specific reasons for the lack of viable formal financial intermediaries in specific communities. What are the major obstacles faced by the target populations, especially the entrepreneurial and marginally self-employed poor, in their attempt for economic and social advancement? To what extent are these obstacles related to the lack of financial services? Would potential clients need additional nonfinancial services, such as training, technical assistance, and health and human services, to be able to make productive use of the loan, and to what extent would such services impact a client's cash flow and a program's subsidy dependence? A focus on such basic market research and needs assessments must be emphasized in feasibility studies before the plan for any microfinance program is drawn up.

Microfinance programs should not be designed without considering their opportunity costs. As most microfinance programs are still subsidy dependent, a dollar spent on supporting a microfinance program means a dollar less for another potential development intervention. To date, little systematic study has been done to estimate the external efficiency of microfinance programs. Part of the reason for the lack of such studies is probably the difficulty in quantifying and comparing the benefits and costs of alternative interventions. Although exact quantification may not be feasible, or even desirable, in many cases, it is important for the development community to understand, at least in terms of qualitative models, the major types of costs and benefits that must be considered when evaluating the external efficiency of a microfinance program.

Last, but not least, as the development community begins to emphasize internal efficiency for microfinance programs, more research is needed to examine what incentive structures are most conducive to such operational efficiency. What institutional arrangements or governance structures are needed to achieve incentive compatibility among donors/shareholders, program managers, and clients? The New Institutional Economics literature (Eggertsson, 1990; Furubotn & Richter, 1997; Lin & Nugent, 1995; Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 1993; Tang, 1992; Williamson, 1985), which emphasizes information, transaction cost, and incentive problems in economic organizations (Bhatt & Tang, 1998a; Prendergast, 1999), can potentially offer useful perspectives, but more work is needed in adapting those perspectives to the context of microfinance delivery.

Nitin Bhatt is Manager at Grant Thornton LLP's Entrepreneurial Consulting Services Practice in Los Angles and former Executive Director of the University of Southern California's (USC) Business Expansion Network. He is the author of Inner City Entrepreneurship Development: The Microcredit Challenge (ISC Press, 2001), and his work in the area of enterprise development has been published in such journals as Harvard Business Review, World Development, Economic Development Quarterly, Public Administration and Development, and International Journal of Technical Cooperation. He has served as an advisor or board member for various nonprofits, foundations, and government entities involved in entrepreneurship and economic development. A Rotary Foundation Scholar, Mr. Bhatt holds an MBA in entrepreneurship and venture management and a Ph.D. in policy, planning, and development from USC.

Shui-Yan Tang is associate professor and Director of the MPA Program at the USC School of Policy, Planning, and Development. He has done extensive theoretical and empirical work on community organizations, microfinance, and environmental policy. He is the author of Institutions and Collective Action: SelfGovernance in Irrigation (ICS Press, 1992), and articles in such journals as The China Quarterly, Land Economics, Public Administration and Development, Public Administration Review, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Productivity and Management Review, and World Development.
结论

未来成功的小额信贷作为发展工具将在很大程度上取决于是否有能力公营，私营和非盈利性组织制定一整套不同的机构，以满足不同的金融需求各部分的低收入人口。设计中的这类机构必须通知深入了解贫困的原因，以及具体原因，缺乏可行的正式金融中介机构在特定的社区。有哪些主要障碍的目标所面临的人口，特别是轻微的创业和自谋职业穷人，他们试图为经济和社会进步？在何种程度上这些障碍是缺乏相关的金融服务？潜在的客户将需要更多的非金融服务，如培训，技术援助，以及卫生和人类服务，能够有效利用的贷款，以及在何种程度上会影响这种服务的客户的现金流和程序的补贴的依赖？把重点放在这些基本的市场调查和需求评估必须强调在可行性研究之前，任何小额信贷计划的制定了计划。

小额信贷项目设计不应该不考虑他们的机会成本。由于大部分小额信贷计划仍然补贴依赖，美元用于支持小额信贷项目是指美元减少为另一种潜在的发展干预。迄今为止，几乎没有系统的研究已经完成，估计外部效率的小额信贷项目。部分原因是缺乏这种研究，可能是难以量化和比较效益和成本的替代措施。虽然确切的量化未必可行，甚至是可取的，在许多情况下，重要的是发展社会理解，至少从质的模式，主要类型的成本和效益时必须考虑外部效益评价一个小额贷款计划。

最后但并非最不重要，因为社会的发展开始强调内部效率的小额信贷项目，更多的研究需要研究如何激励结构最有利于对这种运作效率。什么体制安排和治理结构的需要，以实现捐助者之间的激励相容/股东，项目经理和客户端？新制度经济学文学（ Eggertsson ， 1990年; Furubotn ＆里希特， 1997年;林和根特， 1995年;奥斯特罗姆，施罗德与温， 1993年;唐， 1992年;威廉姆森， 1985 ） ，强调信息，交易成本和激励问题在经济组织（布哈特与唐， 1998年;加斯特， 1999年） ，有可能提供有益的观点，但还需要做更多的工作在适应这些观点的背景下，以小额信贷服务。

尼廷布哈特是经理格兰特桑顿公司的创业咨询服务实践洛杉矶和前执行主任的南加州大学的（南加大）业务拓展网络。他撰写的内城创业发展：小额信贷挑战（国际信息系统安全认证出版社， 2001年） ，他的工作在企业发展领域的出版了诸如杂志哈佛商业评论，世界发展，经济发展季刊，公共管理和发展，国际期刊的技术合作。他曾担任顾问或董事会成员为各种非营利机构，基金会和政府实体参与创业和经济发展。旋转基金会学者巴特先生拥有工商管理硕士学位的企业精神和企业管理和博士学位在政策，规划，从南加州大学和发展。

水燕他嗯副教授和主任的精神创伤和痛苦计划在南加州大学的政策，规划和发展。他做了广泛的理论和实证工作的社区组织，小额信贷，和环境政策。他撰写的机构和集体行动： SelfGovernance灌区（ ICS的出版社， 1992年） ，和文章等期刊作为我国季刊，土地经济学，公共行政和发展，公众行政部门审查，报公共行政研究和理论，公共生产力和管理审查，和世界发展。

Thus donors/shareholders that are providing funds to ongoing programs need to demand financial information and provide appropriate technical assistance on a regular basis, with a special emphasis on employing standardized practices; for instance, in reporting loan recovery, income and costs, and portfolio risk (N. Bhatt, 1998). 因此 ， 捐助者/股东提供资金 ， 以目前的计划需要的财务信息的需求 ， 并提供适当的技术援助 ， 定期，特别强调用人标准的做法，例如，贷款回收的报告，收入和成本，投资风险（注布哈特， 1998年） 。 Lack of accurate financial reporting is the key reason why program inefficiencies are often passed on unchecked, year after year, as a result of which institutional failure often comes as a surprise to many stakeholders. 由于缺乏准确的财务报告的关键是程序效率低下的原因往往是通过不加制止，年复一年，由于体制失败常常可以作为意外许多利益相关者。 Nonetheless, donors/shareholders also have to be cautious in not imposing operational efficiency as the only criterion in evaluating a program. 然而，捐助者/股东还必须实行谨慎的运作效率不作为唯一的标准 ， 评价程序。 Otherwise, program officials may have an incentive to divert their efforts away from serving the poor, who might be the original target population. 否则，计划的官员可能有动力转移他们的努力摆脱服务穷人，谁可能是原先的目标人口。

Program inefficiencies also can result if the clients face incompatible incentives. 计划也可能会导致效率低下 ， 如果客户面临不相容奖励。 It is now well known that clients value convenience and flexibility in accessing financial services more than they value paying a low-interest rate for such services (Otero & Rhyne, 1994). 现在 ， 众所周知 ， 方便客户的价值和灵活性 ， 获得金融服务的价值超过他们付出了低利率对这些服务（奥特罗和Rhyne ， 1994年） 。 Programs that have not assessed the characteristics and needs of their clients often impose high transaction costs on them, as a result of which client noncooperation renders their operations nonviable (Bhatt & Tang, 1998b). 程序还没有评估的特点和需要他们的客户往往征收高额交易成本 ， 对他们，由于该客户端不合作使得其业务亏损（布哈特与唐， 1998年） 。 One example is the difficulties encountered by a microfinance program that tried to implement the group lending model in 一个例子是所遇到的困难小额程序试图执行该集团的贷款模式 Burkina Faso 布基纳法索 . 。 A study by the World Bank (1997) indicates that most of the women surveyed preferred individual to group loans, to avoid possible social animosity among themselves. 研究由世界银行（ 1997年）表明 ， 大部分受访女性首选的个人集团的贷款，以避免可能的社会它们之间的仇恨。 In some communities where the peer group method is socially acceptable, prospective borrowers may seek out the least risky peers to form groups. 在一些社区里的同龄群体是社会上可以接受的方法，借款人可寻求潜在的风险最小的同龄人 ， 形成群体。 Hulme and Mosley (1996) provide evidence of such "social exclusion" in 休姆和莫斯利（ 1996年）提供证据证明这种“社会排斥”的 Sri Lanka 斯里兰卡 's SANASA and 氏SANASA和 Bangladesh 孟加拉国 's BRAC initiatives. 的农村倡议。 In these programs, members identified some people in their villages as being too poor, and hence unsuitable for group membership. 这些程序中，发现了一些人的成员在他们的村庄是太穷了，因此不适合组成员。

These and other similar experiences from around the world indicate that when borrowers face incompatible incentives, forcing them to form groups would create unnecessary burdens on them or undesirable consequences for the program, without enhancing the operational efficiency of the program (Bhatt & Tang, 1998a, 1998b). 这些以及其他类似的经验来自世界各地的说明 ， 当借款人面临不兼容的激励措施，迫使他们形成群体将造成不必要的负担 ， 他们或不良后果的程序，没有提高业务效率的程序（布哈特与唐， 1998年， 1998年） 。

Conclusions 结论

The future success of microfinance as a development tool will depend heavily on the ability of public, private, and nonprofit organizations to develop a diverse set of institutions to meet the different financial needs of various segments of low-income populations. 未来成功的小额信贷作为发展工具将严重依赖的能力 ， 公营，私营和非盈利性组织制定一整套不同的机构 ， 以满足不同的金融需求各部分的低收入人口。 The design of such institutions must be informed by a thorough understanding of the causes of poverty, as well as the specific reasons for the lack of viable formal financial intermediaries in specific communities. 设计这类机构必须通知深入了解贫困的原因 ， 以及具体原因 ， 缺乏可行的正式金融中介机构在特定的社区。 What are the major obstacles faced by the target populations, especially the entrepreneurial and marginally self-employed poor, in their attempt for economic and social advancement? 有哪些主要障碍的目标所面临的人口，特别是轻微的创业和自谋职业穷人，他们试图为经济和社会进步？ To what extent are these obstacles related to the lack of financial services? 在何种程度上这些障碍是缺乏相关的金融服务？ Would potential clients need additional nonfinancial services, such as training, technical assistance, and health and human services, to be able to make productive use of the loan, and to what extent would such services impact a client's cash flow and a program's subsidy dependence? 潜在的客户将需要更多的非金融服务，如培训，技术援助，以及卫生和人类服务，能够有效利用的贷款，以及在何种程度上会影响这种服务的客户的现金流和程序的补贴的依赖？ A focus on such basic market research and needs assessments must be emphasized in feasibility studies before the plan for any microfinance program is drawn up. 把重点放在这些基本的市场调查和需求评估必须强调在可行性研究之前 ， 任何小额信贷计划的制定了计划。

Microfinance programs should not be designed without considering their opportunity costs. 小额信贷项目设计不应该不考虑他们的机会成本。 As most microfinance programs are still subsidy dependent, a dollar spent on supporting a microfinance program means a dollar less for another potential development intervention. 由于大部分小额信贷计划仍然补贴依赖，美元用于支持小额信贷项目是指美元减少为另一种潜在的发展干预。 To date, little systematic study has been done to estimate the external efficiency of microfinance programs. 迄今为止，几乎没有系统研究已经完成 ， 估计外部效率的小额信贷项目。 Part of the reason for the lack of such studies is probably the difficulty in quantifying and comparing the benefits and costs of alternative interventions. 部分原因是缺乏这种研究 ， 可能是难以量化和比较效益和成本的替代措施。 Although exact quantification may not be feasible, or even desirable, in many cases, it is important for the development community to understand, at least in terms of qualitative models, the major types of costs and benefits that must be considered when evaluating the external efficiency of a microfinance program. 虽然确切的量化未必可行，甚至是可取的，在许多情况下，重要的是发展社会理解，至少从质的模式，主要类型的成本和效益时必须考虑外部效益评价一个小额贷款计划。

Last, but not least, as the development community begins to emphasize internal efficiency for microfinance programs, more research is needed to examine what incentive structures are most conducive to such operational efficiency. 最后但并非最不重要，因为社会的发展开始强调内部效率的小额信贷项目，更多的研究需要研究如何激励结构最有利于对这种运作效率。 What institutional arrangements or governance structures are needed to achieve incentive compatibility among donors/shareholders, program managers, and clients? 何种体制安排和治理结构来实现 ， 需要捐助者之间的激励相容/股东，项目经理和客户端？ The New Institutional Economics literature (Eggertsson, 1990; Furubotn & Richter, 1997; Lin & Nugent, 1995; Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 1993; Tang, 1992; Williamson, 1985), which emphasizes information, transaction cost, and incentive problems in economic organizations (Bhatt & Tang, 1998a; Prendergast, 1999), can potentially offer useful perspectives, but more work is needed in adapting those perspectives to the context of microfinance delivery. 新制度经济学文学（ Eggertsson ， 1990年; Furubotn ＆里， 1997年;林和根特， 1995年;奥斯特罗姆，施罗德与温， 1993年;唐家璇， 1992年;威廉姆森， 1985 ） ，强调信息，交易成本和激励问题在经济组织（布哈特与唐， 1998年;加斯特， 1999年） ，有可能提供有益的观点，但还需要做更多的工作在适应这些观点的背景下 ， 以小额信贷服务。

Nitin Bhatt is Manager at Grant Thornton LLP's Entrepreneurial Consulting Services Practice in Los Angles and former Executive Director of the 尼廷布哈特是经理格兰特桑顿公司的创业咨询服务实践洛杉矶和前执行主任 University 九龙东铁大学站 of 的 Southern California 南加州 's (USC) Business Expansion Network. 氏（南加大）业务拓展网络。 He is the author of Inner City Entrepreneurship Development: The Microcredit Challenge (ISC Press, 2001), and his work in the area of enterprise development has been published in such journals as Harvard Business Review, World Development, Economic Development Quarterly, Public Administration and Development, and International Journal of Technical Cooperation. 他撰写的内城创业发展：小额信贷挑战（国际信息系统安全认证出版社， 2001年） ，他的工作在企业发展方面已发表在这样的杂志哈佛商业评论，世界发展，经济发展季刊，公共管理和发展，国际期刊的技术合作。 He has served as an advisor or board member for various nonprofits, foundations, and government entities involved in entrepreneurship and economic development. 他曾担任顾问或董事会成员为各种非营利机构，基金会和政府实体参与创业和经济发展。 A Rotary Foundation Scholar, Mr. Bhatt holds an MBA in entrepreneurship and venture management and a Ph.D. 扶轮基金会学者巴特先生拥有工商管理硕士学位的企业精神和企业管理和博士学位 in policy, planning, and development from USC. 在政策，规划，从南加州大学和发展。

Shui-Yan Tang is associate professor and Director of the MPA Program at the USC School of Policy, Planning, and Development. 水燕他嗯副教授和主任的精神创伤和痛苦计划在南加州大学的政策，规划和发展。 He has done extensive theoretical and empirical work on community organizations, microfinance, and environmental policy. 他已进行了广泛的理论和实证工作的社区组织，小额信贷，和环境政策。 He is the author of Institutions and Collective Action: SelfGovernance in Irrigation (ICS Press, 1992), and articles in such journals as The China Quarterly, Land Economics, Public Administration and Development, Public Administration Review, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Productivity and Management Review, and World Development. 他撰写的机构和集体行动： SelfGovernance灌区（ ICS的出版社， 1992年） ，和文章等期刊作为中国季刊，土地经济学，公共行政和发展，公众行政部门审查，报公共行政研究和理论，公共生产力和管理审查，和世界的发展。

因此 ， 捐助者/股东提供资金 ， 以目前的计划需要的财务信息的需求 ， 并提供适当的技术援助 ， 定期，特别强调用人标准的做法，例如，贷款回收的报告，收入和成本，投资风险（注布哈特， 1998年） 。 Lack of accurate financial reporting is the key reason why program inefficiencies are often passed on unchecked, year after year, as a result of which institutional failure often comes as a surprise to many stakeholders. 由于缺乏准确的财务报告的关键是程序效率低下的原因往往是通过不加制止，年复一年，由于体制失败常常可以作为意外许多利益相关者。 Nonetheless, donors/shareholders also have to be cautious in not imposing operational efficiency as the only criterion in evaluating a program. 然而，捐助者/股东还必须实行谨慎的运作效率不作为唯一的标准 ， 评价程序。 Otherwise, program officials may have an incentive to divert their efforts away from serving the poor, who might be the original target population. 否则，计划的官员可能有动力转移他们的努力摆脱服务穷人，谁可能是原先的目标人口。

Program inefficiencies also can result if the clients face incompatible incentives. 计划也可能会导致效率低下 ， 如果客户面临不相容奖励。 It is now well known that clients value convenience and flexibility in accessing financial services more than they value paying a low-interest rate for such services (Otero & Rhyne, 1994). 现在 ， 众所周知 ， 方便客户的价值和灵活性 ， 获得金融服务的价值超过他们付出了低利率对这些服务（奥特罗和Rhyne ， 1994年） 。 Programs that have not assessed the characteristics and needs of their clients often impose high transaction costs on them, as a result of which client noncooperation renders their operations nonviable (Bhatt & Tang, 1998b). 程序还没有评估的特点和需要他们的客户往往征收高额交易成本 ， 对他们，由于该客户端不合作使得其业务亏损（布哈特与唐， 1998年） 。 One example is the difficulties encountered by a microfinance program that tried to implement the group lending model in 一个例子是所遇到的困难小额程序试图执行该集团的贷款模式 Burkina Faso 布基纳法索 . 。 A study by the World Bank (1997) indicates that most of the women surveyed preferred individual to group loans, to avoid possible social animosity among themselves. 研究由世界银行（ 1997年）表明 ， 大部分受访女性首选的个人集团的贷款，以避免可能的社会它们之间的仇恨。 In some communities where the peer group method is socially acceptable, prospective borrowers may seek out the least risky peers to form groups. 在一些社区里的同龄群体是社会上可以接受的方法，借款人可寻求潜在的风险最小的同龄人 ， 形成群体。 Hulme and Mosley (1996) provide evidence of such "social exclusion" in 休姆和莫斯利（ 1996年）提供证据证明这种“社会排斥”的 Sri Lanka 斯里兰卡 's SANASA and 氏SANASA和 Bangladesh 孟加拉国 's BRAC initiatives. 的农村倡议。 In these programs, members identified some people in their villages as being too poor, and hence unsuitable for group membership. 这些程序中，发现了一些人的成员在他们的村庄是太穷了，因此不适合组成员。

These and other similar experiences from around the world indicate that when borrowers face incompatible incentives, forcing them to form groups would create unnecessary burdens on them or undesirable consequences for the program, without enhancing the operational efficiency of the program (Bhatt & Tang, 1998a, 1998b). 这些以及其他类似的经验来自世界各地的说明 ， 当借款人面临不兼容的激励措施，迫使他们形成群体将造成不必要的负担 ， 他们或不良后果的程序，没有提高业务效率的程序（布哈特与唐， 1998年， 1998年） 。

Conclusions 结论

The future success of microfinance as a development tool will depend heavily on the ability of public, private, and nonprofit organizations to develop a diverse set of institutions to meet the different financial needs of various segments of low-income populations. 未来成功的小额信贷作为发展工具将严重依赖的能力 ， 公营，私营和非盈利性组织制定一整套不同的机构 ， 以满足不同的金融需求各部分的低收入人口。 The design of such institutions must be informed by a thorough understanding of the causes of poverty, as well as the specific reasons for the lack of viable formal financial intermediaries in specific communities. 设计这类机构必须通知深入了解贫困的原因 ， 以及具体原因 ， 缺乏可行的正式金融中介机构在特定的社区。 What are the major obstacles faced by the target populations, especially the entrepreneurial and marginally self-employed poor, in their attempt for economic and social advancement? 有哪些主要障碍的目标所面临的人口，特别是轻微的创业和自谋职业穷人，他们试图为经济和社会进步？ To what extent are these obstacles related to the lack of financial services? 在何种程度上这些障碍是缺乏相关的金融服务？ Would potential clients need additional nonfinancial services, such as training, technical assistance, and health and human services, to be able to make productive use of the loan, and to what extent would such services impact a client's cash flow and a program's subsidy dependence? 潜在的客户将需要更多的非金融服务，如培训，技术援助，以及卫生和人类服务，能够有效利用的贷款，以及在何种程度上会影响这种服务的客户的现金流和程序的补贴的依赖？ A focus on such basic market research and needs assessments must be emphasized in feasibility studies before the plan for any microfinance program is drawn up. 把重点放在这些基本的市场调查和需求评估必须强调在可行性研究之前 ， 任何小额信贷计划的制定了计划。

Microfinance programs should not be designed without considering their opportunity costs. 小额信贷项目设计不应该不考虑他们的机会成本。 As most microfinance programs are still subsidy dependent, a dollar spent on supporting a microfinance program means a dollar less for another potential development intervention. 由于大部分小额信贷计划仍然补贴依赖，美元用于支持小额信贷项目是指美元减少为另一种潜在的发展干预。 To date, little systematic study has been done to estimate the external efficiency of microfinance programs. 迄今为止，几乎没有系统研究已经完成 ， 估计外部效率的小额信贷项目。 Part of the reason for the lack of such studies is probably the difficulty in quantifying and comparing the benefits and costs of alternative interventions. 部分原因是缺乏这种研究 ， 可能是难以量化和比较效益和成本的替代措施。 Although exact quantification may not be feasible, or even desirable, in many cases, it is important for the development community to understand, at least in terms of qualitative models, the major types of costs and benefits that must be considered when evaluating the external efficiency of a microfinance program. 虽然确切的量化未必可行，甚至是可取的，在许多情况下，重要的是发展社会理解，至少从质的模式，主要类型的成本和效益时必须考虑外部效益评价一个小额贷款计划。

Last, but not least, as the development community begins to emphasize internal efficiency for microfinance programs, more research is needed to examine what incentive structures are most conducive to such operational efficiency. 最后但并非最不重要，因为社会的发展开始强调内部效率的小额信贷项目，更多的研究需要研究如何激励结构最有利于对这种运作效率。 What institutional arrangements or governance structures are needed to achieve incentive compatibility among donors/shareholders, program managers, and clients? 何种体制安排和治理结构来实现 ， 需要捐助者之间的激励相容/股东，项目经理和客户端？ The New Institutional Economics literature (Eggertsson, 1990; Furubotn & Richter, 1997; Lin & Nugent, 1995; Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 1993; Tang, 1992; Williamson, 1985), which emphasizes information, transaction cost, and incentive problems in economic organizations (Bhatt & Tang, 1998a; Prendergast, 1999), can potentially offer useful perspectives, but more work is needed in adapting those perspectives to the context of microfinance delivery. 新制度经济学文学（ Eggertsson ， 1990年; Furubotn ＆里， 1997年;林和根特， 1995年;奥斯特罗姆，施罗德与温， 1993年;唐家璇， 1992年;威廉姆森， 1985 ） ，强调信息，交易成本和激励问题在经济组织（布哈特与唐， 1998年;加斯特， 1999年） ，有可能提供有益的观点，但还需要做更多的工作在适应这些观点的背景下 ， 以小额信贷服务。

Nitin Bhatt is Manager at Grant Thornton LLP's Entrepreneurial Consulting Services Practice in Los Angles and former Executive Director of the 尼廷布哈特是经理格兰特桑顿公司的创业咨询服务实践洛杉矶和前执行主任 University 九龙东铁大学站 of 的 Southern California 南加州 's (USC) Business Expansion Network. 氏（南加大）业务拓展网络。 He is the author of Inner City Entrepreneurship Development: The Microcredit Challenge (ISC Press, 2001), and his work in the area of enterprise development has been published in such journals as Harvard Business Review, World Development, Economic Development Quarterly, Public Administration and Development, and International Journal of Technical Cooperation. 他撰写的内城创业发展：小额信贷挑战（国际信息系统安全认证出版社， 2001年） ，他的工作在企业发展方面已发表在这样的杂志哈佛商业评论，世界发展，经济发展季刊，公共管理和发展，国际期刊的技术合作。 He has served as an advisor or board member for various nonprofits, foundations, and government entities involved in entrepreneurship and economic development. 他曾担任顾问或董事会成员为各种非营利机构，基金会和政府实体参与创业和经济发展。 A Rotary Foundation Scholar, Mr. Bhatt holds an MBA in entrepreneurship and venture management and a Ph.D. 扶轮基金会学者巴特先生拥有工商管理硕士学位的企业精神和企业管理和博士学位 in policy, planning, and development from USC. 在政策，规划，从南加州大学和发展。

Shui-Yan Tang is associate professor and Director of the MPA Program at the USC School of Policy, Planning, and Development. 水燕他嗯副教授和主任的精神创伤和痛苦计划在南加州大学的政策，规划和发展。 He has done extensive theoretical and empirical work on community organizations, microfinance, and environmental policy. 他已进行了广泛的理论和实证工作的社区组织，小额信贷，和环境政策。 He is the author of Institutions and Collective Action: SelfGovernance in Irrigation (ICS Press, 1992), and articles in such journals as The China Quarterly, Land Economics, Public Administration and Development, Public Administration Review, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Productivity and Management Review, and World Development. 他撰写的机构和集体行动： SelfGovernance灌区（ ICS的出版社， 1992年） ，和文章等期刊作为中国季刊，土地经济学，公共行政和发展，公众行政部门审查，报公共行政研究和理论，公共生产力和管理审查，和世界的发展。

因此，捐助者/股东提供资金，以目前的计划需要的财务信息的需求，并提供适当的技术援助，定期，特别强调用人标准的做法，例如，贷款回收的报告，收入和成本，投资风险（注布哈特， 1998年） 。由于缺乏准确的财务报告的关键是程序效率低下的原因往往是通过不加制止，年复一年，由于体制失败常常可以作为意外许多利益相关者。然而，捐助者/股东也应谨慎运作效率不强加的唯一标准的评价程序。否则，计划的官员可能有动力转移他们的努力摆脱服务穷人，谁可能是原先的目标人口。

计划也可能会导致效率低下，如果客户面临不相容奖励。现在，众所周知，方便客户的价值和灵活性，获得金融服务的价值超过他们付出了低利率对这些服务（奥特罗和Rhyne ， 1994年） 。程序还没有评估的特点和需求，他们的客户往往征收高额交易成本，对他们，由于该客户端不合作使得其业务亏损（布哈特与唐， 1998年） 。一个例子是所遇到的困难小额程序试图执行该集团的贷款模式在布基纳法索。研究由世界银行（ 1997年）显示，大多数受访女性首选的个人集团的贷款，以避免可能的社会它们之间的仇恨。在一些社区里的同龄群体是社会上可以接受的方法，借款人可寻求潜在的风险最小的同龄人，形成群体。休姆和莫斯利（ 1996年）提供证据证明这种“社会排斥”在斯里兰卡SANASA和孟加拉国的农村倡议。这些程序中，发现了一些人的成员在他们的村庄是太穷了，因此不适合组成员。

这些以及其他类似的经验来自世界各地的说明，当借款人面临不兼容的激励措施，迫使他们形成群体将造成不必要的负担，他们或不良后果的程序，没有提高业务效率的程序（布哈特与唐， 1998年， 1998年） 。

结论

未来成功的小额信贷作为发展工具将在很大程度上取决于是否有能力公营，私营和非盈利性组织制定一整套不同的机构，以满足不同的金融需求各部分的低收入人口。设计中的这类机构必须通知深入了解贫困的原因，以及具体原因，缺乏可行的正式金融中介机构在特定的社区。有哪些主要障碍的目标所面临的人口，特别是轻微的创业和自谋职业穷人，他们试图为经济和社会进步？在何种程度上这些障碍是缺乏相关的金融服务？潜在的客户将需要更多的非金融服务，如培训，技术援助，以及卫生和人类服务，能够有效利用的贷款，以及在何种程度上会影响这种服务的客户的现金流和程序的补贴的依赖？把重点放在这些基本的市场调查和需求评估必须强调在可行性研究之前，任何小额信贷计划的制定了计划。

小额信贷项目设计不应该不考虑他们的机会成本。由于大部分小额信贷计划仍然补贴依赖，美元用于支持小额信贷项目是指美元减少为另一种潜在的发展干预。迄今为止，几乎没有系统的研究已经完成，估计外部效率的小额信贷项目。部分原因是缺乏这种研究，可能是难以量化和比较效益和成本的替代措施。虽然确切的量化未必可行，甚至是可取的，在许多情况下，重要的是发展社会理解，至少从质的模式，主要类型的成本和效益时必须考虑外部效益评价一个小额贷款计划。

最后但并非最不重要，因为社会的发展开始强调内部效率的小额信贷项目，更多的研究需要研究如何激励结构最有利于对这种运作效率。什么体制安排和治理结构的需要，以实现捐助者之间的激励相容/股东，项目经理和客户端？新制度经济学文学（ Eggertsson ， 1990年; Furubotn ＆里希特， 1997年;林和根特， 1995年;奥斯特罗姆，施罗德与温， 1993年;唐， 1992年;威廉姆森， 1985 ） ，强调信息，交易成本和激励问题在经济组织（布哈特与唐， 1998年;加斯特， 1999年） ，有可能提供有益的观点，但还需要做更多的工作在适应这些观点的背景下，以小额信贷服务。

尼廷布哈特是经理格兰特桑顿公司的创业咨询服务实践洛杉矶和前执行主任的南加州大学的（南加大）业务拓展网络。他撰写的内城创业发展：小额信贷挑战（国际信息系统安全认证出版社， 2001年） ，他的工作在企业发展领域的出版了诸如杂志哈佛商业评论，世界发展，经济发展季刊，公共管理和发展，国际期刊的技术合作。他曾担任顾问或董事会成员为各种非营利机构，基金会和政府实体参与创业和经济发展。旋转基金会学者巴特先生拥有工商管理硕士学位的企业精神和企业管理和博士学位在政策，规划，从南加州大学和发展。

水燕他嗯副教授和主任的精神创伤和痛苦计划在南加州大学的政策，规划和发展。他做了广泛的理论和实证工作的社区组织，小额信贷，和环境政策。他撰写的机构和集体行动： SelfGovernance灌区（ ICS的出版社， 1992年） ，和文章等期刊作为我国季刊，土地经济学，公共行政和发展，公众行政部门审查，报公共行政研究和理论，公共生产力和管理审查，和世界发展。

Conclusions

The future success of microfinance as a development tool will depend heavily on the ability of public, private, and nonprofit organizations to develop a diverse set of institutions to meet the different financial needs of various segments of low-income populations. The design of such institutions must be informed by a thorough understanding of the causes of poverty, as well as the specific reasons for the lack of viable formal financial intermediaries in specific communities. What are the major obstacles faced by the target populations, especially the entrepreneurial and marginally self-employed poor, in their attempt for economic and social advancement? To what extent are these obstacles related to the lack of financial services? Would potential clients need additional nonfinancial services, such as training, technical assistance, and health and human services, to be able to make productive use of the loan, and to what extent would such services impact a client's cash flow and a program's subsidy dependence? A focus on such basic market research and needs assessments must be emphasized in feasibility studies before the plan for any microfinance program is drawn up.

Microfinance programs should not be designed without considering their opportunity costs. As most microfinance programs are still subsidy dependent, a dollar spent on supporting a microfinance program means a dollar less for another potential development intervention. To date, little systematic study has been done to estimate the external efficiency of microfinance programs. Part of the reason for the lack of such studies is probably the difficulty in quantifying and comparing the benefits and costs of alternative interventions. Although exact quantification may not be feasible, or even desirable, in many cases, it is important for the development community to understand, at least in terms of qualitative models, the major types of costs and benefits that must be considered when evaluating the external efficiency of a microfinance program.

Last, but not least, as the development community begins to emphasize internal efficiency for microfinance programs, more research is needed to examine what incentive structures are most conducive to such operational efficiency. What institutional arrangements or governance structures are needed to achieve incentive compatibility among donors/shareholders, program managers, and clients? The New Institutional Economics literature (Eggertsson, 1990; Furubotn & Richter, 1997; Lin & Nugent, 1995; Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 1993; Tang, 1992; Williamson, 1985), which emphasizes information, transaction cost, and incentive problems in economic organizations (Bhatt & Tang, 1998a; Prendergast, 1999), can potentially offer useful perspectives, but more work is needed in adapting those perspectives to the context of microfinance delivery.

Nitin Bhatt is Manager at Grant Thornton LLP's Entrepreneurial Consulting Services Practice in Los Angles and former Executive Director of the University of Southern California's (USC) Business Expansion Network. He is the author of Inner City Entrepreneurship Development: The Microcredit Challenge (ISC Press, 2001), and his work in the area of enterprise development has been published in such journals as Harvard Business Review, World Development, Economic Development Quarterly, Public Administration and Development, and International Journal of Technical Cooperation. He has served as an advisor or board member for various nonprofits, foundations, and government entities involved in entrepreneurship and economic development. A Rotary Foundation Scholar, Mr. Bhatt holds an MBA in entrepreneurship and venture management and a Ph.D. in policy, planning, and development from USC.

Shui-Yan Tang is associate professor and Director of the MPA Program at the USC School of Policy, Planning, and Development. He has done extensive theoretical and empirical work on community organizations, microfinance, and environmental policy. He is the author of Institutions and Collective Action: SelfGovernance in Irrigation (ICS Press, 1992), and articles in such journals as The China Quarterly, Land Economics, Public Administration and Development, Public Administration Review, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Productivity and Management Review, and World Development.

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